In Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16, Canada’s highest court, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”), has recognized a new tort described as the “cancer of domestic relationships” (para 3). The recognition of a new tort is itself noteworthy. Canadian courts rarely create new causes of action, preferring to develop the common law incrementally and only where existing remedies are inadequate. The majority found that coercive control presented one of those rare cases (paras 87–90, 139–181). The new tort is called intimate partner violence.
In a 255 page decision, the SCC held that patterns of coercive and controlling conduct can cause a distinct harm that existing torts do not fully address. A plaintiff wishing to prove intimate partner violence must demonstrate (1) that the conduct arose in an intimate relationship or its aftermath, (2) that the defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct and (3) that the conduct amounted to coercive control (para 5).
In this case, the parties were married for 16 years. The husband physically assaulted, intimidated, humiliated, isolated and financially controlled the wife. The trial judge found he sought to “break her will and condition her to obey him” (para 1). The wife, who represented herself at trial, was ultimately awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages for intimate partner violence. It is unusual for a self-represented litigant to bring a case that ultimately results in the SCC recognizing a new tort.
The SCC noted that existing torts such as battery, assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress, follow from individual incidents of abuse. They focus on separate acts that interfere with bodily or psychological integrity. They do not capture the cumulative loss of autonomy that comes from living under another person’s control. Existing torts may compensate for physical and psychological injuries, but they “are incapable of addressing the interference with her autonomy that arises from the cumulative effect of the physical and non-physical modes of coercion” (para 160) experienced throughout the marriage.
Intimate partner violence recognizes the broader effect coercive control has on a victim. The majority explained that intimate partner violence includes “tactics of isolation, manipulation, humiliation, surveillance, economic abuse, sexual coercion and intimidation that can control and entrap intimate partners” (para 7).
The third element of the test for intimate partner violence is assessed objectively. The trial judge “must determine whether a reasonable person, fully apprised of the relevant context of the relationship, would have perceived the defendant’s acts, considered cumulatively, as amounting to an assertion of control over the plaintiff that has the effect of depriving them of their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship” (para 208). Unlike the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff does not have to prove a separate “visible and provable illness.” Instead, “the harm associated with coercion flows from proof of the wrongful conduct,” and “this new tort does not require the plaintiff to prove any consequential harm separately” (para 184).
Ironically, although the SCC endorsed the trial judge’s creation of a new tort, it held that she had applied damages incorrectly. At trial, the wife was awarded $150,000 in damages: $50,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeal reduced the award to $100,000 by setting aside the punitive damages. Although the SCC recognized the new tort of intimate partner violence, it did not increase the damages because neither party appealed the amount awarded. Instead, it held that the trial judge had categorized the damages incorrectly. The SCC ruled that the separate awards for compensatory and aggravated damages should be collapsed into a single award of general compensatory damages because the harms associated with coercive control are part of the tort itself (para. 236).
The SCC emphasized that victims seek recognition not simply as injured spouses, but as people deprived of freedom. As the majority put it, the claim is essentially: “I am not just a bruised spouse, I am an unfree spouse” (para 17). The SCC recognized that this loss of autonomy disproportionately affects women and reflects harm to dignity, autonomy and equality (paras 20-21).
Justice Karakatsanis agreed that a new tort should exist but would have defined it more broadly. In her view, a plaintiff should be able to succeed by proving either coercive control or any act or threat of violence causing physical or psychological harm. She warned that limiting the tort to coercive control may not reflect the lived experiences of all survivors of intimate partner violence.
Three judges dissented. They accepted that intimate partner violence is actionable, but believed existing torts already provided a complete remedy. Since the wife sought $100,000 and received $100,000 under established torts, they saw no need to create a new cause of action. The dissent warned that the new tort may create uncertainty and is better left to legislatures. Their approach focused on compensation in the individual case. The majority took a broader view and emphasized tort law’s role in recognizing and responding to a distinct social harm.